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ABSTRACT
Objective: The inclusion of the Community Health
Index in the recording of National Health Service (NHS)
contacts in Scotland facilitates national linkage of data
such as prescribing and healthcare utilisation. This
linkage could be the basis for identification of adverse
drug reactions. The aim of this article is to report the
views of healthcare professionals on data sharing,
ownership and the legal and other applicable
frameworks relevant to linkage of routinely collected
paediatric healthcare data.
Design: Qualitative study using semistructured face-
to-face interviews addressing the study aims.
Participants: Purposive sample of professional
stakeholders (n=25) including experts on ethics, data
protection, pharmacovigilance, data linkage, legal
issues and prescribing. Interviews were audio-
recorded, transcribed and thematically analysed using a
framework approach.
Results: Participants identified existing data sharing
systems in the UK. Access to healthcare data should be
approved by the data owners. The definition of data
ownership and associated legal responsibilities for
linked healthcare data were seen as important factors
to ensure accountability for the use of linked data. Yet
data owners were seen as facilitators of the proposed
data linkage. Twelve frameworks (legal, regulatory and
governance) applicable to the linkage of healthcare data
were identified.
Conclusions: A large number of potentially relevant
legal and regulatory frameworks were identified.
Ownership of the linked data was seen as an extension
of responsibility for, or guardianship of, the source
datasets. The consensus emerging from the present
study was that clarity is required on the definition of
data sharing, data ownership and responsibilities of
data owners.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Pharmacovigilance describes the assessment,
detection, monitoring and evaluation of
adverse drug reactions (ADRs).1 ADRs can
cause considerable harm2–5 but may be very
rare and only identiﬁable once many people
have taken a drug. The need for a systematic
approach to pharmacovigilance was triggered
by the thalidomide disaster which led to the
introduction of the Drug Amendment Act in
the USA, requiring the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to approve all new
drug applications for use in the USA, and
the establishment of the Committee on
Safety of Drugs in the UK, which in turn
introduced the Yellow Card Scheme, a
scheme for the spontaneous reporting of sus-
pected ADRs.6 Systems and regulations were
further reﬁned over time including the intro-
duction of the European Medicines Agency
(EMA) to coordinate drug licensing in
Europe.7
Before a drug is licensed and marketed,
only a small cohort of patients has been
exposed to a given drug.4 Therefore, post-
marketing surveillance is an essential compo-
nent of medication safety. In the UK, the
national licensing agency, the Medicines and
Healthcare products Regulatory Agency
(MHRA), requires companies to provide
drug safety data to before they make a licens-
ing recommendation8 9 unless application is
made to the EMA for licensing and market-
ing across the European Union. After licens-
ing, ADRs are identiﬁed by spontaneous
reporting such as the Yellow Card
Scheme and information is then cascaded to
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ Purposive sampling ensured identification and
inclusion of wide range of stakeholders.
▪ Participants found it challenging to discuss a
service they had not experienced.
▪ Consensus was reached suggesting that the
responses were valid.
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relevant healthcare professionals. There are also systems
which speciﬁcally target a particular medication, for
example, the Prescription Event Monitoring in
Southampton, UK, and which requests extended data
from prescribers. New MHRA standards for ADR report-
ing and signal management will lead to reporting to a
central, pan-European database,10–12 resulting in the cre-
ation of EudraVigilance.13 This database will be built on
reports on suspected ADRs submitted by its member
states.
Despite this, it is well accepted that, in general, ADRs
are under-reported. Some research suggests that current
rates represent only 10–15% of the true rate.14 This is
particularly the case for drugs used in children, many of
which do not have a license for a paediatric use, and yet
children exposed to ‘unlicensed’ medication are more
likely to experience an ADR than children receiving
licensed products.13 15
Other approaches to improve pharmacovigilance are,
therefore, required. Previous studies have shown that
routinely collected healthcare data can be used to gener-
ate signals of ADRs, that is, indicators of a possible
causal relationship between an ADR and a speciﬁc
drug.16–19 Each patient in National Health Service
(NHS) Scotland has a unique patient identiﬁer (allo-
cated at birth or ﬁrst contact with the Scottish NHS)
used for each patient contact which would theoretically
allow robust matching between different datasets, such
as data from the family doctor, hospitals and dispensed
prescriptions. Linking available routinely collected elec-
tronic healthcare data may provide a solution. A data
linkage infrastructure already exists in Scotland20–22 as
well as other countries.23–25 Linking datasets from
primary and secondary care would allow following the
patient in real time, providing denominators as well as
avoiding duplication of signal generation, that is, report-
ing the same reaction twice. Routine data linkage would
permit creation of a continuous virtual cohort to
monitor for long-term outcomes, for example, after
exposure to pharmacotherapy, and enable a more efﬁ-
cient screening for side effects or ADRs due to an ever
increasing data pool.26 Creating a large cohort can
sometimes be challenging in children if the group of
patients is below 1000, as can be the case for orphan
drugs or rare conditions.27 In addition, off-label or
unlicensed drugs, often used in paediatrics, are not
subject to the rigorous postmarketing surveillance
schemes, which leaves the evidence in this ﬁeld incom-
plete.28 Combining datasets from primary and secondary
care would maximise the potential to identify safety
issues around paediatric medication.23 However, its
routine use might raise ethical and legal questions about
privacy and conﬁdentiality as well as other issues.20 29–31
The work presented here is part of the CHIMES (Child
Medical Records for Safer Medicines) programme in
Scotland, a research project which is developing a new
system for drug monitoring and surveillance based on
linkage of routinely collected paediatric healthcare data
from primary and secondary care, and prescriptions dis-
pensed from community pharmacies.
OBJECTIVE
The aim of the work reported here was to elicit the
views of relevant stakeholders to the linkage of routinely
collected NHS data for the purpose of earlier identiﬁca-
tion of ADRs in children. A further aim was to inform
recommendations for a data linkage project.
METHODS
Design, subjects and settings
Semistructured face-to-face interviews were undertaken
with a purposive sampling of stakeholders with profes-
sional interests and responsibilities in accessing and
using Scottish NHS data to capture views on the pro-
posed linkage of administrative NHS data for paediatric
pharmacovigilance (n=36 invitations were sent).
Purposive sampling was used to ensure representation
from a range of relevant perspectives including ethics,
public health, data protection, pharmacovigilance, data
linkage, legal issues, paediatrics and prescribing, as well
as diverse clinical backgrounds including medical
doctors, nurses and pharmacists from primary and sec-
ondary care were approached to take part. The areas of
interest as listed was compiled after a literature review
and consequently a list of organisations was compiled
that would cover the identiﬁed topics. Invitations were
sent directly to selected members of these organisations
either as representatives of the organisation or because
of their personal expertise in an identiﬁed topic.
Materials and data collection
An interview topic guide was developed (available on
request), guided by the research question “What are the
views of professional stakeholders towards linked NHS
data across Scotland” and informed by a review of
current literature.32 The topic guide and interview tech-
nique were piloted in two interviews, which suggested the
paediatric context of the proposed data linkage should
be emphasised more clearly. The invitation letter con-
tained a study information sheet and a consent form,
which the participants returned by post prior to the inter-
view. Interviews were conducted face-to-face or by tele-
phone as requested. All interviews were audio-recorded.
Data management and analysis
Interviews were transcribed verbatim and checked
against the recording. A framework approach33 was used
to identify themes inductively and deductively from the
transcripts. The ‘Framework’ approach as postulated by
Ritchie and Spencer33 describes a thematic analysis of
data that includes comparison of participants’ responses
to selected themes. It allows for the organisation of the
‘raw’ data into categories, and follows a deﬁned ﬁve-step
process: familiarisation, identifying themes, indexing,
charting and mapping and interpretation. Three
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interviews were independently coded by two researchers
(YMH and CBB). A ﬁnal thematic framework was
agreed following discussion to clarify any initial incon-
sistencies. The framework was then validated by coding a
further transcript independently by two researchers
(YMH and JH). Differences between coders in allocating
quotations to the main themes were resolved after dis-
cussion. Data management and coding were conducted
using QSR NV.7.
RESULTS
A total of 23 interviews was conducted between February
and October 2010 with 25 participants (at the participant’s
request 2 dyadic interviews were conducted), the length
varying between 25 and 84 min. Table 1 shows the diversity
of participants’ interests and backgrounds. Eleven of the
14 Scottish Health Boards were represented.
Five main themes were identiﬁed: (1) views and
understanding of pharmacovigilance, (2) opinions on
available data within the NHS, (3) beliefs about the
usage of linked data, (4) opinions about the dissemin-
ation of ﬁndings and (5) views of the proposed data
linkage. Two central subthemes of theme 5 were data
sharing and data ownership in relation to the current
legal framework. These are reported in detail below.
Data sharing
Participants highlighted that data sharing between
primary and secondary care in Scotland was already a
reality, for example, as in the Emergency Care
Summaries (a summary of basic information about a
person’s health including their name, date of birth,
Community Health Index (CHI) number and medicines
prescribed by the general practitioner (GP)), but raised
the issue of potential gaps in (electronic) data sharing
due to the continued use of paper records. In contrast,
community pharmacies, which generally keep electronic
records, were perceived as being reluctant to share data
due to their commercial setting:
Again…accessing pharmacy data is not that easy because
they are individual businesses and are fairly reluctant to
share stuff electronically. (A22, male, GP)
Concerns were raised that data linkage/sharing could
lead to identifying an individual patient:
Because you are talking small numbers and there might
be only one child in the country that has that condition.
(A14, female, public health)
We’ve had local issues […] where we tried to keep it
anonymous but because the disease is so rare and the
drug is so rarely used, […] it’s hard to maintain anonym-
ity here. (A24, female, pharmacy)
Caldicott Guardians (individuals who control access to
NHS patient information) were seen as enablers of
appropriate data sharing at regional (Health Board)
level as Boards were perceived to be beyond the remit of
central scrutiny (eg, the Privacy Advisory Committee
(PAC) of NHS National Services Scotland (NSS)):
The Health Board can do pretty much what they want
with their data that would probably be beyond the remit
of PAC. (A11, male, non-clinical, legal background)
Data ownership
The deﬁnition of data ownership and, by implication,
legal responsibility for the linked dataset and the
accountability in the event of any misconduct were seen
as important. The need for clarity about who owns the
data was raised as a main issue by participants. Indeed,
one participant questioned whether data can be owned
at all:
How are you capable of owning data that belongs to a
patient? Lord Goff in one of his rulings stated that in so
far as it is being capable of being owned, NHS person
speciﬁc healthcare data is public domain. (A04, male,
medical consultant)
One participant referred to the data controller men-
tioned in the Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998 that, if
there were more than one data controller for each given
dataset, responsibilities could become complicated:
You need to have deﬁned who is responsible for the data
set really. […]So that’s the ﬁrst thing because quite often
what you ﬁnd […] there is not really a very clear sense of
who makes decisions about them. (A09, female, Caldicott
guardian, physician)
Legally, it was believed that data controllers should
decide what happens to data, which means that the
Information Service Division (ISD) of the NHS would
be responsible for datasets held at ISD but not for data
held by individual Health Boards. This would also mean
that GPs were the data controller for patients’ data, but
not everyone agreed:
I don’t think we should talk about my data because
patient data is not the doctor’s data. (A11, male, non-
clinical, legal background)
Table 1 Covered interests by number of participants
Pharmacovigilance Prescribing
Legal
issues
Data
protection Caldicott
Information
Governance
Involvement in
data linkage
projects eHealth
Public
health Ethics Paediatrics
5 5 5 4 2 4 6 4 6 4 3
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Furthermore, it was believed that GPs already have
strong feelings of data ownership and that this might
lead to reluctance to share the data:
GPs have this feeling […] that the data is their data and
it doesn’t belong to anybody else. (A14, female, public
health)
Another participant saw the data as the property of
the NHS:
The data should be seen as belonging to the NHS and
therefore used for important NHS purposes and I think
you would be hard put to argue that pharmacovigilance
wasn’t one of those. (A18, male, non-clinical, Public
Health and Pharmacoepidemiology)
Legal and regulatory framework
Twelve different frameworks were cited while discussing
what laws might apply to the proposed project. The DPA
1998 was mentioned most frequently, followed by the
Common Law of Duty of Conﬁdentiality and the
Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002. Less fre-
quently mentioned were the Caldicott Principles and
Information Governance in general, and single refer-
ences were given for child protection, European Law,
Privacy Impact Assessment and the PAC. Two legal acts
mentioned, Section 251 and the Health Services Control
of Patient Information Regulation 2002, are not applic-
able to Scotland. However, participants thought that
Scottish legislation would allow the proposed use of the
proposed data linkage:
We have legislation in Scotland that allows the use of data
for epidemiological or quality improvement purposes as
long as the population is kept informed of it and as long
as it is securely anonymised. (A03, male, academic GP)
In addition, further restrictions and potential chal-
lenges in view of child protection issues versus public
interest were mentioned:
The law’s concerned about protecting the child, it’s not
concerned about necessarily promoting public interest.
(A11, male, non-clinical, legal background)
DISCUSSION
Participants identiﬁed 12 legal and regulatory frame-
works that might have to be taken into account when
discussing the linkage of routinely collected healthcare
data. Existing schemes of data sharing in Scotland
within the healthcare context were discussed, and pro-
blems with the deﬁnition and responsibility of data own-
ership were identiﬁed.
Strengths and limitations of the study
The strength of our approach was the purposive sam-
pling to identify a wide range of interested stakeholders.
The purposive sampling was designed to ensure
inclusion of representatives from a wide range of organi-
sations and backgrounds and a potentially wide range of
views. We spoke to participants with a legal background
as well as a paediatric background and included experts
on pharmacovigilance and ethics and clinicians from all
areas. Data saturation within the sample was reached
with the later interviews as no new issues were identiﬁed.
Data saturation was reached with the reported sample,
nonetheless, we cannot guarantee the ﬁndings beyond
the current sample. Utilising highly informed interview
partners allowed extraction of high-level barriers and
challenges to the proposed linkage, but it also means
that the views described here do not necessarily reﬂect
the opinions of frontline healthcare professionals.
However, the methods we used are illustrative of good
practice in terms of research and consultation, and in
the current age of rapid technological development, the
results provide a framework of issues that should be con-
sidered in other contexts that involve the linkage and
secondary use of patient records. The information pro-
vided to participants about the proposed data linkage
was only outlined in summary as it was hoped that parti-
cipants would help to shape the proposed data linkage
by suggesting data for linkage and relevant barriers
without being inﬂuenced by the background informa-
tion provided. It was hoped that this approach would
generate a wider range of perceived barriers and issues
compared with participants responding to a ﬁxed system
design. Although participants found it hard to articulate
their views about the proposed data linkage for pharma-
covigilance, there was consensus around the ﬁve identi-
ﬁed themes and as such the ﬁndings of this study could
inform the design of a pharmacovigilance system based
on linked routinely acquired patient data. The legal and
regulatory frameworks discussed in this article were
solely identiﬁed by the interviewees. It might be possible
that relevant frameworks have not been identiﬁed
whereas other frameworks discussed might not be
applicable to the ﬁnal data linkage project.
Problems with data sharing
The main concern was that increased data sharing
could theoretically risk inappropriate identiﬁcation of
individuals, although in practice the size of a linked
dataset at national level would make this unlikely.
Nonetheless, participants wanted further controls,
including required approval by Caldicott Guardians, in
order to eliminate inadvertent and unintentional use
of the data. However, Health Board Caldicott
Guardians are not responsible for data collected within
general practices, and there could be a need for others
to be involved as Information Governance or Caldicott
Leads.34 While the DPA only applies to the use of ‘iden-
tiﬁable’ patient data and not to anonymised data,35 it is
recognised that data can never be fully anonymised as
the original source data include patient identiﬁable
information. Furthermore, the unique patient CHI
number, which would be used for accurate
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deterministic linkage, would fall under the deﬁnition
of personal data within the DPA.36 Professional guid-
ance and standards such as the General Medical
Council (GMC) promoted in their guideline on conﬁ-
dentiality allows the sharing of personal patient data in
justiﬁed circumstances, stating that “conﬁdentiality is
an important duty, but it is not absolute.”37 Disclosures
are possible when it is required by the law, for example,
in questioning ﬁtness to practice, or when patients give
explicit consent for the sharing of their data.
Furthermore, and of relevance to data linkage, the
GMC guideline also states that if the disclosure of the
information is “to enable medical research, education
or other secondary uses of information that will beneﬁt
society over time”,37 sharing information is possible
without patient consent. Further guidance reiterates
that disclosure would be preferred in an anonymised
format but that patient identiﬁable information can be
shared without explicit consent if it is justiﬁed in the
public interest and if necessary.38 That advice follows
the second Caldicott principle “Don’t use service user
identiﬁable information unless it’s absolutely necessary”
(ref. 34, p.17). As the CHI number is necessary to iden-
tify and link data between primary and secondary care
correctly, and as the guidance explicitly states research,
epidemiology and public health surveillance as import-
ant secondary uses of medical data,38 it would be difﬁ-
cult to impose an absolute ban on access to the data
for pharmacovigilance. Thomas and Walport30 men-
tioned ‘cultural barriers to appropriate sharing’ (ie, a
‘culture of caution’) in their report and suggest that
perceptions of risk might prevent data from being
shared in practice.
Data ownership as a challenge
Establishing the owners of the datasets for linkage was
seen as a major issue and there is an apparent lack of
clarity on this. The DPA deﬁnes data collectors and data
processors but not ownership.36 The Wellcome report
repeatedly refers to GPs as advocates for patients’ data
but does not refer to data ownership.29 Data ownership
is discussed widely in the literature39–41 but few have
attempted a deﬁnition other than discussing the implica-
tion and responsibilities that lie within the (undeﬁned)
‘ownership’. The Oxford dictionary deﬁnes ‘ownership’
as “the act, state, or right of possessing something.”42 In
medical law ‘ownership’ is mostly used when discussing
body parts or samples from patients.43 In our interviews,
the term ‘data ownership’ seemed to be inextricably
linked with responsibility for the data owned. The
responsibilities that participants expected from ‘data
owners’ included controlling access to the data within
the current legal framework. So the term ‘data owner’
might be more about legal responsibilities than physical
ownership. Accepting that deﬁnition, data controllers
would have to be contacted and asked for permission to
link ‘their’ data. Therefore, the way forward might be a
named data controller for the linked dataset, who would
assume responsibility and accountability. The DPA
acknowledges that there may be more than one data
controller at a time, that is, jointly or in common with
another individual, which could be pertinent to the use
of linked data drawn from several datasets.
Accountability, as an added incentive to prevent security
breaches, has been successfully employed by QResearch,
a non-proﬁt organisation jointly owned by the University
of Nottingham and EMIS (Egton Medical Information
Systems Limited), a clinical software provider, which uses
anonymised health records from primary care.44
Implications
The plethora of different stakeholders, the mix of poten-
tially applicable, albeit contradictory, laws and guidelines
create confusion among researchers and decision-
makers when it comes to data sharing and data linkage.
Clear legal guidance on data sharing and a working def-
inition of data ownership are required for both, develo-
pers of linked data systems and the end users of the
linked data, in order to avoid ambiguity of opinion.
Identiﬁcation of the data controller of each individual
dataset that is linked is necessary as is the appointment
of individuals or accountable organisations to own the
linked data. One proposal arising from the present study
could be the use of a Privacy Impact Assessment of the
planned linkage in order to identify any privacy risks
potential. For example, a protocol for information gov-
ernance, based on the one in use at NHS ISD Scotland,
could include approval of the planned linkage by the
already established PAC of ISD. Additionally, it should
comply with the NSS Conﬁdentiality guidelines and the
ISD Disclosure protocol.45 It should be noted that PAC
is an advisory, rather than statutory body; however, it is
unlikely that its advice would be contravened. Although
potentially complex, such a system could be brought
together in a single application process analogous to the
current Multicentre Research Ethics Committee (UK)
and NHS approval processes.46
CONCLUSION
The complex and conﬂicting nature of the current legal
situation informed the stakeholders’ views of data
sharing and data ownership. Data sharing, as in the pro-
posed data linkage for paediatric pharmacovigilance,
was not opposed by stakeholders. The most commonly
held view emerging from the present study was that
clarity is required on the deﬁnition for data sharing,
data ownership and responsibilities of data owners,
although the need for a more explicit legal framework
was identiﬁed. The ﬁndings presented here will be com-
pared with the ﬁndings of a parallel study exploring the
views of the public on the proposed data linkage (cur-
rently ongoing) as ideally any ﬁnal recommendations
for this project should be drawn from both relevant
populations, healthcare professionals as data collectors
and the public as data providers.
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